Knopf, May 2008
"Legacy of Ashes is the record of the first sixty years of the Central Intelligence Agency. It describes how the most powerful country in the history of Western civilization has failed to create a first-rate spy service. That failure constitutes a danger to the national security of the United States."
Those chilling, but accurate words begin Legacy of Ashes, a fascinating account by a respected journalist, not an angry, disgruntled former CIA employee. Tim Weiner has won two Pulitzers and has written about the American intelligence community for more than twenty years. There are no anonymous sources. Every statement or quote is attributed. The 601 pages of text are supplemented by 172 pages of notes and a 31-page index that will take the reader to just about anything he might want to find in a hurry.
Legacy of Ashes is divided into six parts that deserve recognition. After reading the opening "Author's Note," one could skip to the part covering a particular timeframe or interest before reading the whole. Part One, 'In the Beginning, We Knew Nothing," covers the formation of the CIA under Truman, 1945 - 1953. Part Two, "A Strange Kind of Genius," covers the Eisenhower Era, 1953 - 1961. Part Three, "Lost Causes," covers, as one might expect, the CIA under Kennedy and Johnson, 1961 - 1968. Part Four, "Get Rid of the Clowns," covers the CIA under Nixon and Ford, 1968 - 1977. Part Five, "Victory Without Joy," covers the CIA under Carter, Reagan, and Bush I, 1977 - 1993. Part Six, "The Reckoning," covers the CIA under Clinton and Bush II, 1993 - 2007.
"Legacy of Ashes is the record of the first sixty years of the Central Intelligence Agency. It describes how the most powerful country in the history of Western civilization has failed to create a first-rate spy service. That failure constitutes a danger to the national security of the United States."
Those chilling, but accurate words begin Legacy of Ashes, a fascinating account by a respected journalist, not an angry, disgruntled former CIA employee. Tim Weiner has won two Pulitzers and has written about the American intelligence community for more than twenty years. There are no anonymous sources. Every statement or quote is attributed. The 601 pages of text are supplemented by 172 pages of notes and a 31-page index that will take the reader to just about anything he might want to find in a hurry.
Legacy of Ashes is divided into six parts that deserve recognition. After reading the opening "Author's Note," one could skip to the part covering a particular timeframe or interest before reading the whole. Part One, 'In the Beginning, We Knew Nothing," covers the formation of the CIA under Truman, 1945 - 1953. Part Two, "A Strange Kind of Genius," covers the Eisenhower Era, 1953 - 1961. Part Three, "Lost Causes," covers, as one might expect, the CIA under Kennedy and Johnson, 1961 - 1968. Part Four, "Get Rid of the Clowns," covers the CIA under Nixon and Ford, 1968 - 1977. Part Five, "Victory Without Joy," covers the CIA under Carter, Reagan, and Bush I, 1977 - 1993. Part Six, "The Reckoning," covers the CIA under Clinton and Bush II, 1993 - 2007.
It is this last section that has the most interest for us. Under Bush I, there had been yet another series of major failures of intelligence gathering. Our Iranian spies had been compromised, caught, and tortured to death, closing the "CIA's window" on Iran and Iraq. Although the CIA did warn the President of the potential for an invasion of Kuwait (only 24 hours prior!) Bush I called the leaders of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both of whom assured him that would not happen. Of course, it did and a few days later there were assurances for and against Iraq possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Fast forward to President Clinton whose foreign policy was "more of a business plan than a policy" and headed by a "national-security team (that) was second-string." His choice for director met twice with Clinton in two years so the agency had no direction and that resulted in "no intelligence network." Throughout Clinton's presidency, the mistakes and shortcoming of the CIA pilled up: Somalia, Haiti, World Trade Center bomb.
In '97 Porter Goss, head of the House intelligence committee, provided a prophetic analysis of the state of the CIA in which he noted that in 2001 "analysis (would have become) become dangerously fragmented." Facts were collected but analysis was overwhelmed by the volume of facts. "From the vantage point of 2001, intelligence failure is inevitable." Between '91 and '98 nearly 20 percent of the CIA's senior spies, analysts, and technology experts left. Another 7 percent were leaving every year, providing for a continuing weakening of the CIA and its ability to gather and analyze data. "Very few of its officers could read or speak Chinese, Korean, Arabic, Hindi, Urdu, or Farsi-the languages of three billion people, half the planet's population."
Under Bush II, the problems that had been simmering from Reagan through Bush I and Clinton came to a head. The eighteen intelligence services were fragmented. The new President did not "hear" the message about the threat Osama bin Laden represented. "It's not enough to ring the bell, Richard Helms used to say. "You've got to make sure the other guy hears it." In the summer of 2001 warnings were coming from every station, and the President was not listening. Then, after 9/11 there was a rush to find information. More than 3,000 persons were arrested as potential terrorists; less than two dozen were upper level "management" for bin Laden.
Under Bush II, the problems that had been simmering from Reagan through Bush I and Clinton came to a head. The eighteen intelligence services were fragmented. The new President did not "hear" the message about the threat Osama bin Laden represented. "It's not enough to ring the bell, Richard Helms used to say. "You've got to make sure the other guy hears it." In the summer of 2001 warnings were coming from every station, and the President was not listening. Then, after 9/11 there was a rush to find information. More than 3,000 persons were arrested as potential terrorists; less than two dozen were upper level "management" for bin Laden.
In August of '02 Vice President Dick Cheney stated there was no doubt that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Bush II reiterated this belief in October and CIA Director Tenet, to his self-proclaimed shame 4 years later, supported that claim. That Iraq had WMD was based on the testimony of one of many who had endured torture, then recanted. Ultimately, we went to war with Iraq, based in large part on "the worst body of work" in the CIA's long history, a national intelligence estimate, "Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction." Our soldiers are still dying due to the results of that.
In the late '70s, while I was still in the Naval Reserve, our intelligence unit was tasked with developing information about a particular area of the Soviet Union. If one of our airplanes were shot down, then the pilot would have the information necessary to survive on the ground, find food and water, and discover likely sympathizers who would help keep him safe. How did I help gather this intelligence? I went to the library of the University of North Carolina and read books and precious few primary sources. All the information was old and would certainly be much older by the time my report was combined into our unit's report and sent up the line. In a microcosm, this has been the bane of the CIA. Intelligence from outdated sources, rather than from assets (spies) on the ground has led to repeated failures of mission.
In the late '70s, while I was still in the Naval Reserve, our intelligence unit was tasked with developing information about a particular area of the Soviet Union. If one of our airplanes were shot down, then the pilot would have the information necessary to survive on the ground, find food and water, and discover likely sympathizers who would help keep him safe. How did I help gather this intelligence? I went to the library of the University of North Carolina and read books and precious few primary sources. All the information was old and would certainly be much older by the time my report was combined into our unit's report and sent up the line. In a microcosm, this has been the bane of the CIA. Intelligence from outdated sources, rather than from assets (spies) on the ground has led to repeated failures of mission.
